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The Influence of Board Structure on the Value of NZX Listed Firms 
and its Association with Growth Options 
 
Abstract 
 
Our study examines the relationship between four indicators of board structure and firm 
value and the extent to which this relationship may be affected by the level of growth 
options relative to assets-in-place. These indicators are the level of accounting expertise, 
gender diversity, the level of independence and the size of the board. Using a sample of 
543 firm-years covered by 125 firms listed on the New Zealand Exchange for the 1998-
2007 financial years, we found that these board structure indicators together with the 
level of growth options significantly impact on firm value after effectively controlling 
for the endogeneity problem. Specifically, firms with a lower number of directors with 
accounting expertise and/or a higher number of female directors on the board have 
higher firm value. For firms with a higher level of growth options, a higher percentage 
of independent directors on the board and/or a larger board are more value relevant. Our 
findings related to board accounting expertise and board gender diversity particularly 
may have important implications for corporate regulators. 
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1 Introduction 
The board of directors are viewed as “the lynchpin of corporate governance” (Gillan, 
2006, p. 385). Fama and Jensen (1983) characterise board’s responsibilities as including 
both the ratification of management decisions and the monitoring of management 
performance. In addition, the board of directors has the power to hire, fire and 
compensate the senior management team. The board’s responsibilities for monitoring 
managers’ actions ensure that such actions are aligned with shareholders’ interests and 
operates to mitigate managerial opportunism (Fama and Jensen, 1983). These 
fundamental roles of the board of directors, as a critical component of a good corporate 
governance system, have given rise to a great deal of research investigating the value 
relevance of an effective board of directors. 
Despite this rich literature, there has been little research that examines the relationship 
between various aspects of the board structure and firm value and the extent to which 
the level of growth options relative to assets-in-place affects this relationship. Within 
this limited literature, research studies examining the association between board 
structure and firm value in the presence of growth options tend to focus on only one 
specific aspect of the board structure, namely board independence, rather than a 
combined set of various aspects of the board structure. Furthermore, board size has only 
been used as a control variable. In addition, these research studies are only based on a 
cross-sectional data set. Using a sample of 306 firms listed on the Australian Securities 
Exchange drawn from the UTS Accenture “Who Governs Australia” database for the 
year 2001, Matolcsy et al. (2004) found that firms with larger investments in growth 
options could benefit from having more outside directors which was reflected through a 
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higher firm market value. Another research study by Orr et al. (2005), which is based on 
a sample of 60 randomly selected firms listed on the New Zealand Exchange (NZX) 
during the year 2001, documents that firms with high level of growth options were more 
likely to have a higher proportion of outside directors on the board than firms with a 
low level of growth options. This in turn has a positive effect on the relationship 
between board independence and firm value. 
Our study extends these prior research studies by examining the relationship between 
four important board structure indicators and firm value, and the extent to which the 
level of growth options relative to assets-in-place affects this relationship. These four 
board structure indicators are the level of accounting expertise, gender diversity, the 
level of independence and the size of the board. The study is based on a longitudinal 
sample of 125 firms listed on the NZX which covers 543 firm-years with financial 
reporting dates ending between 31 January 1998 and 31 December 2007. Our results 
provide strong evidence that these four board structure indicators together with the level 
of growth options have a significant influence of firm value after effectively controlling 
for the endogeneity problem. Specifically, firms with a lower level of accounting 
expertise and/or a higher level of female directors on the board are associated with 
higher firm value. A higher level of independent directors on the board and/or larger 
board is more value relevant for firms with a higher level of growth options relative to 
assets-in-place. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, our study is the first study 
which analyses the impact on firm value of the level of accounting expertise on the 
board and board gender diversity and its association with the level of growth options 
 3 
 
relative to assets-in-place. Second, our study is based on a longitudinal data set which 
provides more generalisable results than those documented in prior research studies 
which only focus on a cross-sectional data sample. Third, we effectively employ two-
stage least squares to control for potential endogeneity problem between board structure 
and firm value, which has not previously used in prior research studies on board 
structure, growth options and firm value. Our study also departs from prior research 
studies in this area as it considers board size as an important component of board 
structure rather than as a control variable. 
The remainder of our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarise relevant 
literature on board structure, growth options and firm value and describes the research 
hypotheses. An overview of the research design is provided in section 3. Section 4 
presents the results and our study concludes in section 5. 
2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Four Board Structure Indicators and the Measures of their Effectiveness 
The board of directors with its dual responsibilities of monitoring management and 
ratifying decisions, underpinned by its fiduciary obligations to the company, is 
generally viewed as an important corporate governance mechanisms (Gillan, 2006). 
From an agency theory perspective, the board’s monitoring role operates to protect 
shareholders from the self interests (agency costs) of management. Accordingly, the 
more a board is able to effectively monitor management, the more agency costs will be 
reduced. Numerous research studies have shown that the level of accounting expertise 
on the board, board gender diversity, the level of independence on the board and board 
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size all individually enhance the board’s ability to operate as an effective corporate 
governance mechanism (John and Senbet, 1998; Carter et al., 2003; Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005). 
First, the presence of directors with accounting or financial expertise on the board is 
argued to enhance the board monitoring performance (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). 
According to Felo et al. (2003), firms with a higher percentage of directors with 
accounting or financial expertise on the board tended to have higher financial reporting 
quality. Firms which had at least one financial expert on the board were less likely to be 
required to restate earnings (Abbott et al., 2004). Interestingly, Defond et al. (2005) 
document that accounting expertise, not the overall financial expertise, is the 
determinant of the improvement of an audit committee’s ability to ensure high financial 
reporting quality, especially for firms with a strong corporate governance structure. 
Second, it is contended that board diversity in general, and board gender diversity in 
particular, promotes a better understanding of the marketplace, increases creativity and 
innovation as well as enhances the effectiveness of corporate leadership (Robinson and 
Dechant, 1997). In addition, Cox and Blake (1991) argue that firms that deal with 
diversity-related issues well should have cost advantages over firms that do not. In fact, 
according to Keys et al. (2002), firms ranked by Fortune as being among the “diversity 
elite” added more value to their shareholders compared to non-diversity promoters. 
Carter et al. (2003) also found significant positive relationships between the percentage 
of women or minorities on the board and firm value after effectively controlling for 
size, industry and other corporate governance measures. 
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Third, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that a larger proportion of non-executive directors 
on the board could enhance board monitoring performance. According to Chen and 
Jaggi (2000), firms with a higher percentage of non-executive directors on the board 
were more engaged and provided more comprehensive statutory disclosures. Firms with 
a higher level of board independence were less likely to engage in earnings management 
(Klein, 2002). In addition, Matolcsy et al. (2004) and Orr et al. (2005) both document 
that firms with more outside directors on the board have higher firm value, especially in 
the presence of high level of growth options relative to assets-in-place. 
Lastly, board size is argued to enhance board monitoring performance, as appointing 
more directors on the board would enhance board knowledge and provide greater 
capacity to share the monitoring responsibilities (Song and Windram, 2004; Karamanou 
and Vafeas, 2005). However, larger boards are posited to be less flexible and less 
efficient due to higher coordination costs and less effective communication (John and 
Senbet, 1998; Coles et al., 2008). According to Bradbury et al. (2006), firms with a 
greater number of directors on the board tended to have high earnings quality. However, 
Yermack (1996) documents a negative relationship between board size and firm value. 
Given that most NZX listed firms are relatively small, the first effect could be 
reasonably argued to dominate the second. 
Drawing from both the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, it is argued that 
the level of accounting expertise on the board, board gender diversity, the level of 
independence on the board and board size are positively related to board monitoring 
performance as an effective corporate governance mechanism. 
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2.2 The Influence of Board Structure on Firm Value and its Association with 
Growth Options 
Where an agency problem or conflict of interests exists among stakeholders of a firm, 
corporate governance in general, and board structure in particular, are more important. 
An effective corporate board is especially useful to ameliorate those issues arising from 
the separation of ownership and control and where such agency problems cannot be 
satisfactorily contracted away due to significant uncertainty, information asymmetry 
and contracting costs (Hart, 1995). According to Bushman and Smith (2003), corporate 
governance serve two important purposes: (1) to ensure that minority shareholders 
receive reliable information about the value of firms and that a company’s managers 
and large shareholders do not cheat them out of the value of their investments, and (2) 
to motivate managers to maximise firm value instead of pursuing personal objectives. 
Based on this theoretical argument and together with the empirical evidence relating to 
the role of an effective board structure in mitigating managerial opportunism, the 
hypothesis in regard to the influence of board structure on firm value is stated as 
follows: 
H1: A more effective board structure is more value relevant. 
A firm’s value is a function of its expected future cash flows, discounted for risk and 
time. Cash flows can be generated from assets-in-place and from the realisation of 
growth options. Assets-in-place represent the firm’s investments in real or physical 
assets while growth options represent the firm’s value of the opportunity for future 
investments in assets (Orr et al., 2005). 
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Compared to assets-in-place, growth options are more firm-specific and are more 
difficult to trade on secondary markets as their value is mostly determined jointly by 
other assets held by the firm (Matolcsy et al., 2004). The nature of such investments in 
growth options creates an increased need to monitor management (Smith and Watts, 
1992; Skinner, 1993). This is because of concerns that management may use their 
discretion to make decisions that are in their self interests and as a result do not 
maximise firm value for shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This need is 
exacerbated when the proportion of a firm’s growth options to assets-in-place increases. 
In order to mitigate this problem, the firm can introduce measures to more effectively 
monitor management. Measures such as having more directors with accounting 
expertise, more female directors, more independent directors and/or increasing board 
size combine to create a board structure that will more effectively monitor management. 
Firms with a more effective board structure reduce the opportunities for management to 
act opportunistically and provide more experience and knowledge that ensures growth 
options are exercised optimally. Therefore, the hypothesis regarding the impact of 
growth options on the relationship between board structure and firm value is stated as 
follows: 
H2: A more effective board structure is more value relevant for firms with 
higher growth options. 
3 Research Design 
3.1 Study Period and Sample 
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The sample selection process commences with the 317 firms listed in the Events section 
of the NZX database as at 17 September 2008. After a deduction of 113 firms for which 
data is not available on the NZX database, 31 firms which are listed on the New 
Zealand Alternative Market (NZAX) and 48 firms that have issued at least 5 annual 
reports since being listed on the NZSX, the final sample comprises 125 firms in total. 
These 125 firms cover a total of 897 firm-years with financial reporting dates ending 
between 31 January 1998 and 31 December 2007. After deleting 17 firm-years with 
negative book value of equities and 337 firm-years with missing board structure 
indicators, the total firm-years in the final sample is 543. 
Details about this sample selection process are provided in Table 1 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
3.2 Data Sources 
The NZX listing status was extracted from the Events section of the NZX database as at 
17 September 2008. Data related to board structure was carefully extracted from the 
annual reports which are provided in the Annual Reports section of the NZX database. 
Accounting and market-related data was obtained from either the NZX database or the 
Datastream database. 
3.3 Board Structure 
As discussed in section 2.1, the effectiveness of board structure is related to the level of 
accounting expertise on the board, board gender diversity, the level of independence on 
the board and board size (John and Senbet, 1998; Carter et al., 2003; Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005). In the context of our study, we use the percentage of directors with 
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accounting expertise (BRDACCEXP), the percentage of female directors 
(BRDDIVERSITY), the percentage of non-executive directors (BRDINDP) and the total 
number of directors (BRDSIZE) on the board as proxies for the level of accounting 
expertise, gender diversity, the level of independence on the board and board size, 
respectively (see Table 2). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
It can be seen from Table 3 that the correlations among these board structure indicators 
are not significant enough to indicate a multicollinearity problem. Therefore, we follow 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) to use only single indicators to measure the effectiveness 
of board structure and reject the necessity to use exploratory principal component factor 
analysis (PCA) as suggested in Larcker et al. (2007) or Truong and Dunstan (2010). 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
According to Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), there are other factors which might 
impact both board structure and firms attributes. These firm attributes can include firm 
value. Therefore, a spurious correlation may be observed between board structure and 
firm value. Board structure is empirically documented to be related firm size, leverage 
and growth prospects. In order to address the concern about the expected spurious 
relationship between board structure and firm value and detect a one-way causal effect 
of board structure on firm value, a two-stage least squares method is employed. The 
natural logarithm of the total assets, the natural logarithm of the total liabilities divided 
by the total equity and the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the 
book value of equity are used as proxies for firm size, leverage and growth prospects, 
respectively. 
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In the first stage, each board structure indicator was regressed on the three proxies for 
firm size, leverage and growth prospects; and the residuals of each board structure 
indicator were obtained. These residuals represent the unexplained portion of the board 
structure indicators which are not explained by the firm characteristics identified in 
prior literature. In the second stage, the residuals of these board structure indicators 
replace the original board structure indicators in the model used to test the impact of 
board structure on firm value and its association with growth options. Specifically, the 
residuals BRDACCEXP_R, BRDDIVERSITY_R, BRDINDP_R and BRDSIZE_R replace 
the original BRDACCEXP, BRDDIVERSITY, BRDINDP and BRDSIZE, respectively. 
3.4 Growth Options 
Consistent with Orr et al. (2005), growth options are measured by the value of growth 
opportunities to the market value of firm. The market value of firm is measured by the 
market value of equities plus the book value of total liabilities and the growth 
opportunities is the difference between the market value of firm and the book value of 
total assets. 
While Orr et al. (2005) use a dummy variable which indicates whether the firm is in the 
high growth options group (top 50 percent based on the growth options value) and 
Matolcsy et al. (2004) employ the market to book value of equities as a proxy for 
growth options, we use the actual value of growth options. 
3.5 Hypothesis Testing Procedures 
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To test the relationship between board structure and firm value and the extent to which 
this relationship is affected by growth options, we employ a form of the Ohlson's (1995) 
model as a basis to estimate the following regression equation: 
MVEi,t = a0 + a1BVEi,t + a2NPATi,t + a3LEVERAGEi,t + a4BRDACCEXP_Ri,t + 
a5BRDDIVERSITY_Ri,t + a6 BRDINDP_Ri,t + a7BRDSIZE_Ri,t + a8GROWTHi,t + a9 
BRDACCEXP_R_GROWTHi,t + a10BRDDIVERSITY_R_GROWTHi,t + 
a11BRDINDP_R_GROWTHi,t + a12BRDSIZE_R_GROWTHi,t + µ
where: 
i,t 
MVE = market value of equities per share basis at the end of 
the current financial year 
BVE = book value of equities per share basis at the end of the 
current financial year 
NPAT = earnings per share at the end of the current financial 
year 
LEVERAGE = the natural logarithm of the book value of total 
liabilities divided by the book value of total equities at 
the end of the current financial year 
BRDACCEXP_R = the residual value of the BRDACCEXP indicator 
BRDDIVERSITY_R = the residual value of the BRDDIVERSITY indicator 
BRDINDP_R = the residual value of the BRDINDP indicator 
BRDSIZE_R= the residual value of the BRDSIZE indicator 
GROWTH = the difference between the market value of firm and 
the book value of total assets divided by the market 
value of firm at the end of the current financial year 
(the market value of firm is the market value of 
equities plus the book value of total liabilities) 
BRDACCEXPT_R_GROWTH = BRDACCEXPT_R multiplied by GROWTH 
BRDDIVERSITY_R_GROWTH = BRDDIVERSITY_R multiplied by GROWTH 
BRDINDP_R_GROWTH = BRDINDP_R multiplied by GROWTH 
BRDSIZE_R_GROWTH = BRDSIZE_R multiplied by GROWTH 
 
The variables of interests in testing H1 are the residuals of the four board structure 
indicators. Significant positive coefficients on these variables confirm this hypothesis. 
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For H2, the variables of interests are the four interactions variable between the residuals 
of the board structure indicators and growth options. If H2 is correct, we expect to 
observe significant positive coefficients on these interaction variables. 
LEVERAGE is included to control for the the effect that capital structure could have on 
equity value (Orr et al., 2005). Also, numerous research studies suggest that leverage 
could confound the value relevance of outside directors (Jensen, 1986, 1989; Anderson 
et al., 1993; Gul and Tsui, 1998). Also, prior to estimating the model, the skewness and 
kurtosis statistics are checked for this variable and extreme values are winsorised to 
preserve the characteristics of the original data while minimising the possible distortion 
of results by these extreme values. The maximum number of observations winsorised is 
low at the level of 5 percent of the sample observations. 
4 Results 
4.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. 
The mean of the market value of equity per share, book value of equity per share and 
earnings per share is $2.875, $1.759 and $0.144, respectively. The average leverage is 
relatively high at 1.685 compared to the average of 1.246 for ASX listed firms reported 
in Matolcsy et al. (2004). The percentage of directors with accounting expertise, female 
directors and non-executive directors is 27.6, 5.6 and 85 percent, respectively. The 
percentage of non-executive directors is far higher than the 66.5 percent for ASX listed 
firms documented in Matolcsy et al. (2004). The average board size is 6.5 which is 
similar to that of 6.6 for ASX listed firms. The mean of growth options is 0.166. 
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[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
To facilitate the analysis of our hypotheses, we first divide the 543 firm-years in the 
entire sample into a low growth options group and a high growth options group based 
on the variable GROWTH. Untabulated descriptive statistics for the GROWTH variable 
of these two groups are as follows: (1) for the 272 firm-years in the low growth options 
group, the mean, median and standard deviation of GROWTH is -0.133, -0.032 and 
0.321, respectively; and (2) for the 271 firm-years in the high growth options group, the 
mean, median and standard deviation of GROWTH is 0.467, 0.461 and 0.186, 
respectively. The value of growth options for the high growth options group is 
significantly larger for that reported for the low growth options group at the 1 percent 
level using both two-tailed t-test (t-statistic = 26.674 and p-value = 0.000) and Mann-
Whitney z-test (z-statistic = 20.162 and p-value = 0.000). 
Table 5 compares the dependent and independent variables (except for GROWTH) for 
low and high growth options groups. It is obvious from Table 5 that the mean MVE for 
firms with high growth options ($3.656) is significantly higher than that for firms with 
low growth options ($2.096) at the 1 percent level. It is interesting to observe that the 
mean BVE for firms with high growth options ($1.461) is significantly lower than that 
for firms with low growth options ($2.056) at the 1 percent level. The mean NPAT for 
high growth options group ($0.210) is far higher than that of low options group ($0.078) 
and the difference between the two groups is significant at the 1 percent level. The mean 
LEVERAGE for firms with low growth options is -0.357 which is higher than the -0.484 
reported for the high growth options group. However, this difference is not significant. 
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Among the four board structure indicators (accounting expertise, gender diversity, 
independence and size), only gender diversity shows a significant difference at the 1 
percent level between the two groups. The percentage of female directors on board for 
firms with high growth options is 6.9 percent compared to only 4.4 percent documented 
for firms with low growth options. The percentage of directors with accounting 
expertise and non-executive directors on board and board size are quantitatively similar 
across the two groups. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
The regression results of testing our two hypotheses are presented in Table 6. The 
coefficient estimate on BRDACCEXP_R is -1.576 and is significant at the 1 percent 
level, which rejects H1 with regard to accounting expertise. A lower percentage of 
directors with accounting expertise on the board is more value relevant. The coefficient 
estimate on BRDDIVERSITY_R is 1.983 and is significant at the 5 percent level, which 
confirms H1 with regard to gender diversity. Firms with a higher percentage of female 
directors on the board are associated with higher market value of equities. The 
coefficients on BRDINDP_R and BRDSIZE are positive but are not significant. 
Therefore, H1 is only accepted in respect of board gender diversity. 
The coefficient estimates on BRDINDP_R_GROWTH and BRDSIZE_R_GROWTH are 
positive and are significant at the 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively, which leads to the 
acceptance of H2 with regard to independence and size. The percentage of non-
executive directors on the board and board size are more value relevant for firms with 
higher growth options. However, the coefficient estimates on 
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BRDACCEXP_R_GROWTH and BRDDIVERSITY_R_GROWTH are positive but are not 
significant. Therefore, H2 is only accepted in respect of board independence and size. 
The value of growth options relative to assets-in-place is critically important when 
determining the effect on firm value of board independence and size. 
Other results in Table 6 show that the coefficient estimates on BVE, NPAT, LEVERAGE 
and GROWTH are all positive and are significant at the 1 percent level. In addition, the 
regression estimated has high explanatory power, as determined by the adjusted R2
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 of 
0.769 and the F-statistic of 151.150, which is significant at the 1 percent level. 
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
First, White’s heteroscedasticity standard errors are used to allow the refitting of the 
model which may contain heteroscedastic residuals. The results obtained from retesting 
the model are quantitatively similar to the main findings. 
Second, the model is retested inclusive of each of the industry dichotomous variables 
for the six major industry categories: (1) materials, mining or energy, (2) technology, 
telecommunication or biotechnology, (3) financial services, (4) utilities, airports, 
airlines, ports or shipping, (5) manufacturing or healthcare, and (6) consumer staples. It 
is interesting to observe that firms in the materials, mining or energy industries are 
associated with higher market value of equities while firms in the financial services, 
manufacturing or healthcare industries have lower market value of equities. The other 
results are not significantly different from the main findings. 
5 Conclusion 
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The objective of our study is to examine the relationship between four important board 
structure indicators and firm value, and the extent to which the level of growth options 
relative to assets-in-place affects this relationship in New Zealand. 
Based on a sample of 543 firm-years covered by 125 firms listed on the NZX with 
financial reporting dates ending between 31 January 1998 and 31 December 2007, our 
results document significant evidence that the four board structure indicators together 
with the level of growth options significantly impact on firm value after effectively 
controlling for the endogeneity problem. Firms with a lower number of directors with 
accounting expertise and/or a higher number of female directors on the board have 
higher firm value. For firms with a higher level of growth options relative to assets-in-
place, a higher percentage of independent directors on the board and/or a larger board 
are more value relevant. 
The findings related to board accounting expertise and board gender diversity 
particularly may have important implications for corporate regulators. It is interesting to 
observe that while board gender diversity adds value to a firm, the same conclusion 
cannot be reached with regard to accounting expertise. Our findings on gender diversity 
are consistent with overseas regulatory developments promoting the percentage of 
female directors on the board. Most notably the ASX recently amended its Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations to require listed companies to publish a 
policy concerning diversity and to annually disclose progress towards gender diversity 
in the firm generally and on the board. 
The major limitation of our study is that it focuses a small sample within a small 
jurisdiction of New Zealand; therefore, the generalisability of the findings reported in 
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this study is potentially diminished. Given that the sample firms must have survived a 
minimum of five years since being listed in order to be included in the final sample, the 
findings from this study may not be representative for newly listed firms. In addition, as 
we adopt the percentage of non-executive directors on the board as a proxy for board 
independence, this proxy may not accurately capture the percentage of truly 
independent directors on the board. The percentage of non-executive directors on the 
board was employed in our study as the data regarding the percentage of truly 
independent directors on the board was not disclosed before October 2003. 
Therefore, future research could extend the dataset and examine the relationship 
between true board independence and firm value. In addition, our model could be 
retested on a dataset obtained from a larger jurisdiction and/or including newly listed 
firms. Further research could also be undertaken to explain our findings concerning the 
value relevance of accounting expertise. 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection Procedure 
Selecting Criteria Number of Observations 
Sample Firms  
Total firms listed on the Events section of the NZX database as at 17 
September 2008 
317 
Less firms listed on the Events section of the NZX database not covered 
by the NZX database 
(113) 
Less firms listed on the NZAX (31) 
Less firms not issuing at least 5 annual reports since being listed on the 
NZSX 
(48) 
Total firms in the final sample 125 
Sample Firm-years  
Total firm years for 125 firms 897 
Less firm-years with negative book value of equities (17) 
Less firm-years with missing board structure indicators (337) 
Total firm-years in the final sample 543 
1 The total number of firm-years includes all firm-years with financial reporting dates ending between 31 
January 1998 and 31 December 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Definitions of Board Structure Indicators 
BRDACCEXP The percentage of directors with accounting expertise on the board. 
BRDDIVERSITY The percentage of female directors on the board. 
BRDINDP The percentage of non-executive directors on the board. 
BRDSIZE The number of directors on the board. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Correlation Matrix for Board Structure Indicators 
 BRDACCEXP BRDDIVERSITY BRDINDP 
BRDDIVERSITY -0.155 
0.000** 
  
BRDINDP 0.032 
0.464 
-0.005 
0.910 
 
BRDSIZE -0.084 
0.049* 
0.143 
0.001** 
0.087 
0.043* 
^, * and ** denote significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). Pearson, point-
biserial and Phi correlation coefficients are followed by p-value. See Table 2 for definitions of board 
structure indicators. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Median Standard Deviation 
MVE ($) 2.875 1.650 3.339 
BVE ($) 1.759 1.086 2.472 
NPAT ($) 0.144 0.094 0.417 
Total Liabilities/Total 
Equities 
1.685 0.794 3.953 
LEVERAGE -0.421 -0.230 1.321 
BRDACCEXP (%) 0.276 0.250 0.165 
BRDDIVERSITY (%) 0.056 0.000 0.090 
BRDINDP (%) 0.850 0.857 0.156 
BRDSIZE (Number) 6.494 6 1.903 
GROWTH 0.166 0.174 0.398 
See Section 3 for definitions of variables 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Univariate Comparison between Variables for Low and High Growth Option Firm-years 
 Low Growth Option 
N = 272 
High Growth Option 
N = 271 
Low vs. High 
Growth Option 
Variables Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
t-test Mann-
Whitney 
test 
MVE ($) 2.096 1.035 2.877 3.656 2.900 3.585 5.589** 7.366** 
BVE ($) 2.056 1.166 2.913 1.461 0.983 1.889 -2.824** -3.320** 
NPAT ($) 0.078 0.068 0.445 0.210 0.766 1.146 3.733** 5.664** 
Total 
Liabilities/Total 
Equities 
2.353 0.815 5.390 1.015 0.766 1.146 -4.005** -0.736 
LEVERAGE -0.357 -0.205 1.481 -0.484 -0.267 1.138 -1.121 -0.736 
BRDACCEXP 0.270 0.250 0.173 0.283 0.250 0.156 0.967 1.329 
BRDDIVERSITY 0.044 0.000 0.090 0.069 0.000 0.089 3.160** 4.130** 
BRDINDP 0.859 0.875 0.153 0.841 0.857 0.160 -1.358 -1.528 
BRDSIZE 6.485 6 1.842 6.502 6 1.966 0.101 0.524 
^, *, ** Characteristics are significantly different at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). See 
Section 3 for definitions of variables. 
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Table 6 
Summary of the OLS Regression Coefficients for the Relationship between the Market Value of a 
Firm and the Accounting Value of Equity, Earnings, Board Structure and Growth Options 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-statistic p-value 
Intercept ? 0.457 0.097 4.700 0.000** 
BVE + 1.046 0.031 33.670 0.000** 
NPAT + 1.309 0.180 7.280 0.000** 
LEVERAGE ? 0.219 0.053 4.110 0.000** 
BRDACCEXP_R + -1.576 0.466 -3.380 0.001** 
BRDDIVERSITY_R + 1.983 0.887 2.240 0.013* 
BRDINDP_R + 0.069 0.500 0.140 0.445  
BRDSIZE_R + 0.015 0.049 0.310 0.380  
GROWTH + 2.842 0.186 15.260 0.000** 
BRDACCEXP_R_GROWTH + 0.985 1.099 0.900 0.186  
BRDDIVERISTY_R_GROWTH + -2.607 2.289 -1.140 0.128  
BRDINDP_R_GROWTH + 1.987 1.093 1.820 0.035* 
BRDSIZE_R_GROWTH + 0.444 0.129 3.430 0.001** 
Adjusted R 0.769 2     
F-statistic 151.150**     
p-value 0.000**     
^, * and ** denotes significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. One-tailed (two-tailed) test 
is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). See Section 3 for definitions of variables. 
 
